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Abstract
In [30], Kleijn presented a survey of the use of team automata for the specification
and analysis of phenomena from the field of computer supported cooperative work,
in particular notions related to groupware systems. In this paper we present a
survey of the use of team automata for the specification and analysis of some issues
from the field of security.
Key words: team automata, access control, security,
cryptographic communication protocols
1 Introduction
Team Automata (TA) have originally been introduced in the context of Com-
puter Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) [5,15], but they have since proved
their use also in the context of security [3,4,6,7]. In [30] a survey of their use
for CSCW was presented. In this paper we survey the use of TA for security.
TA are inspired by—and form an extension of—Input/Output automata
(IOA) [37]. Like IOA, TA form a flexible framework for modelling communi-
cation between components of distributed and reactive systems. They model
the logical architecture of a system by describing it solely in terms of an au-
tomaton, the role of actions, and synchronizations between these actions. A
TA is composed of component automata (CA), which are ordinary automata
without final states and with a distinction of their actions into input, output
and internal actions. The only difference between a CA and an IOA is that
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IOA are by definition input enabled : in each state it must be possible to exe-
cute every input action. The crux of composing a TA is to define the way in
which its constituting CA communicate by synchronizations. Whereas IOA
are constructed according to a single and very strict method of composing
automata, in effect resulting in composite automata that are uniquely defined
by their constituents, there is no such thing as the unique TA composed over
a given set of CA. Rather, a whole range of TA, distinguishable only by their
synchronizations, can be composed over this set of CA. In particular, contrary
to the case of IOA, in TA also output actions may be synchronized upon.
The rigorous setup of these frameworks allows one to formulate and verify
general and specific logical properties of complex (distributed, reactive) sys-
tems in a mathematically precise way. In realistically large computer systems,
security is a big issue, and these frameworks allow formal proofs of correctness
of its design. Moreover, such a formal approach forces one to unambiguously
describe one’s design and it may suggest new approaches not seen otherwise.
The particular characteristics of TA with respect to IOA were showed to be
useful in specific circumstances, two of which we describe next. In [4], the syn-
chronization of output actions was used to define co-called peer-to-peer and
master-slave synchronizations. These are two important CSCW phenomena,
which were thus introduced with a clear practical motivation in mind. Neither
of them can however be distinguished in IOA. In [6], the freedom of choosing
the synchronizations of a TA over a set of CA was used to define a so-called
multicast composition operator ‖J as a one-to-J synchronization between a
sender and a subset J of the total set of receivers. This notion cannot be
distinguished in IOA.
This paper is a tutorial overview of research conducted in the last four years
concerning the use of TA for the specification and analysis of security issues.
In particular, it covers the specification of several access control strategies
of [4]—which were consequently verified in [3] and are currently being inves-
tigated further—as well as the ongoing work on developing a TA framework
for the analysis of security properties—which was initiated in [6] and further
developed in [7]. Let us now describe each of these approaches in more detail.
In [4] the potential of TA for capturing information security and protec-
tion structures, and critical coordinations between these structures, is demon-
strated. On the basis of a spatial access metaphor, various known access
control strategies are formally specified in terms of synchronizations in TA.
Moreover, in [3] an attempt was initiated to validate some of the resulting
specifications with the model checker Spin [29].
In [6], subsequently, the potential of TA for modelling secure multicast
and broadcast communication was showed. To this aim, TA were used to
model an instance of a particular stream signature protocol. The one-to-many
and one-to-all communications that are so typical of multicast and broadcast
communications, could be captured by TA in a native way as synchronizations
between the set of CA constituting a TA.
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In [7], finally, a framework for security analysis with TA has been devel-
oped. First, an insecure communication scenario for TA was defined, based
on adding a so-called most general intruder to a TA model of a secure com-
munication protocol. The intruder is modelled as an active agent able to
influence the communication among honest agents. This insecure scenario
is general enough to encompass various communication protocols. Secondly,
the Generalized Non-Deducibility on Compositions (GNDC) schema of [23]
was reformulated in terms of TA and, subsequently, a compositional analysis
strategy was described for it, which can be used for verifying security prop-
erties in the communication protocol modelled by the scenario. Thirdly, this
framework was applied to show that integrity is guaranteed for a case study in
which TA model a particular instance of the Efficient Multi-chained Stream
Signature (EMSS) protocol family of [42]. This case study shows the effec-
tiveness of this TA approach for a realistic stream signature protocol, thus
facilitating an easy comparison for those familiar with other approaches.
The approach to use an automata-based formalism for the specification
and verification of properties in the field of security is not unique, but has
become very popular in recent years [26,32,35,40,41,43]. We briefly describe
some approaches closest to those surveyed in this paper.
In [43], so-called Security Automata are defined as a form of Bu¨chi au-
tomata, similar to ordinary (finite) automata, and applied to a simple access
control model. Similar to composition of IOA and TA, so-called conjunction
security automata are defined. It remains to see whether also complex access
control policies with delegation and revocation can be modelled by security
automata. We anticipate that in [4] TA are used exactly for such policies.
In [35], an experiment involving the combination of simple shared-key com-
munication with the Diffie-Hellman key distribution protocol [12] is modelled
and proved correct using IOA. As noted by the author herself, a limitation of
this approach is the fact that the protocol allows only purely passive eavesdrop-
pers to listen in on the communication. This choice simplifies the formulation
of compositional results, as an eavesdropper cannot change the course of com-
munication, e.g. by conducting a communication in which it pretends to be
an honest participant. The approach does provide attractive compositional
reasoning techniques. We anticipate that in [7] an active intruder has been
modelled in a TA setting.
Finally, another related approach can be found in [40,41], where Interac-
tive State Machines (ISMs)—yet another extension of IOA—are introduced
and applied to security analysis. In fact, ISMs are used to model and ana-
lyze the classic Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol in the
version fixed by Lowe [34]. A strong point of this approach is the fact that
it allows automatic verification by defining ISMs, and proving theorems, in
the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [39]. What is missing are solid techniques
for compositional reasoning over more complex communication protocols. We
anticipate that in [7] a compositional analysis strategy for TA is defined.
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The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we informally de-
scribe how to use TA, after which the above-mentioned papers are surveyed
in Sections 3-5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Team Automata
In this section we informally describe the main characteristics of TA and how
to use them, rather than defining the framework in all its technical details.
For more information on TA the reader is referred to [2,30,46].
To model a system as a TA, first the components have to be identified.
Each of them should be given a description in the form of an automaton—
an easy to understand state-transition model that moreover forms the basis
for system descriptions in a number of model-checking tools [29,31]. Based
on the idea of synchronizations of common actions, these components can be
connected in order to collaborate. Within each component, a distinction has
to be made between internal actions—which are not available for synchro-
nization with other components—and external actions—which can be used to
synchronize components and may be subject to synchronization restrictions.
By assigning such different roles to actions it is possible to describe many
types of collaboration.
Consequently, for each external action separately, a decision is made as to
how and when the components should synchronize on this action. If the action
is supposed to be a passive action that may not be under the component’s
local control, then it can be designated as an input action of that component,
otherwise as an output action. If such a distinction between the roles of
an external action is not necessary, then the choice is arbitrary. A natural
option would be to make it an output action in all components in which it
occurs. Once the synchronization constraints for each external action have
been determined, one may apply, e.g., a maximality principle to construct a
unique TA satisfying all constraints. The composition used in IAO, e.g., is
mirrored by the so-called max-ai TA over a set of CA. In such a max-ai TA
the synchronizations between CA that are included are, for all actions, all and
only those transitions in which all CA participate in which the action occurs.
The TA framework thus supports component-based system design by mak-
ing explicit the role of actions and the choice of transitions that govern the
collaboration between components. The crucial features are the freedom of
choice for the synchronizations collected in the transition relation of a TA and
the possibility of synchronizing on output actions. In fact, in order for a TA to
be capable of modelling various types of collaboration between its components
by synchronizations of common actions, synchronizations between output ac-
tions of its components should not be excluded a priori, nor should the set
of synchronizations be fixed a priori. Since these two features allowed the
definition of the above-mentioned peer-to-peer and master-slave synchroniza-
tions, they were given by [15] as the main reasons for introducing TA to model
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groupware systems rather than using IOA for that purpose. The last feature
distinguishing TA from IOA, finally, is the fact that TA need not be input
enabled. Also this feature is motivated from practice. No matter how conve-
nient input enabling may be when modelling reactive systems, it does hinder a
realistic modelling of collaborations that involve humans—in fact, Tuttle him-
self was the first to acknowledge this when he introduced IOA in [45]—while
modelling such collaborations was one of the main reasons for the introduction
of TA in [15].
3 Access Control Policies
A vital component of the security of any (computer) system or environment
is information access control, but this is sometimes done in a rather ad hoc
or inadequate fashion with no underlying rigorous, formal model. In typical
electronic file systems, access rights such as read access and write access are
allocated to users on some basis such as ownership or ad hoc lists of accessors.
Within groupware systems, typically more refined access rights are needed,
such as the right to scroll a document that is being synchronously edited by
a group in real time. Furthermore, the granularity of access must be more
fine grained and flexible in many cases, such as within a software development
team. Finally, it is important to control meta access rights. For example, it
may be useful for an author to grant another team member the right to grant
file access to non-team members (i.e. delegation).
In [4], a spatial access metaphor based upon work of Bullock et al. [9,10]—
where access control is governed by rooms, or spaces, in which subjects and
objects reside, and the ability of a subject to traverse space in order to get
close to an object—is used. A virtual reality was considered in which a user
can traverse from room to room by using keyboard keys, the mouse, or fancier
devices. It is a natural and simple extension to assume that access control
checking happens at the boundaries (doors) between spaces (rooms) when a
user attempts to move from one room to another. If the access is OK, then
the user can enter and use the resources associated with the newly entered
room. By adopting a spatial approach to access control, one exploits a nat-
ural part of the environment, making it possible to hide explicit technical
security mechanisms from end users through the natural spatial makeup of
the environment. These users can then make use of their knowledge of the
environment to understand the implicit security policies. Users can thus avoid
understanding technical concepts such as access control matrices, which helps
to avoid misunderstandings.
In the security literature, authentication deals with verification that the
user is truly the person represented, whereas authorization deals with valida-
tion that the user has access to the given resource. In [4], only authorization
is considered. The goal was to connect the metaphor of spatial access con-
trol to the TA framework, and to show how this combination facilitates the
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identification and unambiguous description of some key issues of access con-
trol. To this aim, it was showed how certain spatial access control mechanisms
can be made precise and given a formal description using TA. To begin with,
information access modelling by granting and revoking access rights was in-
troduced, and it was showed how immediate versus delayed revocation (does
a user immediately lose its access rights when they are revoked—even if it is
currently actively using the file—or can a user continue its current activity
when its rights have been revoked until it wants to restart this activity—at
which moment an authorization check is done to decide whether or not it has
the right to restart this activity?) can be formulated.
Subsequently, the study was extended to the more complex issue of meta
access control. This means that privileges such as granting and revoking of
access rights can themselves be granted and revoked. The notion of meta
obviously extends to arbitrary layers. An example of such a multi-layered
structure of meta can be seen in the journal refereeing process. The creator
of an article may delegate publication responsibilities to co-authors, who may
select a journal and grant read access rights to the editor-in-chief, who may
grant read access rights to assistant editors, who can then grant and revoke
read access to reviewers. However, should revocation of a meta right also
revoke the rights that were passed on to others? Here one touches upon the
issue of shallow versus deep revocation. Shallow revocation means that a
revoke action does not revoke any of the rights that were previously passed on
to others, whereas deep revocation means that a revoke action does revoke all
rights previously passed on. Shallow revocation is often the easiest to model,
whereas deep revocation is known as a big challenge to model and implement
due to the complicated (recursive) situations that may arise [11]. In [4] it
was nevertheless demonstrated how TA can be used to unambiguously and
concisely model shallow, deep, and even hybrid revocation.
In [3] an initial attempt to validate some of the TA specifications of [4]
with the model checker Spin [29] was undertaken. Model checking is an auto-
matic technique to verify whether a system design satisfies its specifications by
inspecting its behavior exhaustively, i.e. all possible input combinations and
states are taken into account. The design is to be given in terms of (finite) au-
tomata and the properties that should hold are to be given in terms of logical
formulae. The model checking algorithm then checks whether the particular
model satisfies the particular property. Spin is one of the best known and
most successful model checkers, which was developed at Bell Labs during the
last two decades [29]. In [3], the TA specifications of [4] were translated into
Promela, which is the input language of Spin. Consequently, it was verified
whether those TA specifications indeed model deep revocation. It turned out
that an additional notion of fairness was needed, designating certain states
as “illegal” in the sense that a TA is not allowed to remain in those states
for more than a limited period of time. Further research in this direction is
currently being undertaken.
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4 Multicast/Broadcast Communication Protocols
Multicast/broadcast communication technology was born with the intent of
saving bandwidth and CPU time with respect to the standard point-to-point
connection known as unicast. A single virtual connection indeed uses no more
bandwidth and resources for thousands of users than it does for a single user.
Multicast and broadcast communication however present substantial differ-
ences. A sender transmitting a stream of data to a set of receivers could
broadcast the stream to all the connected recipients (e.g. TV broadcasts) or
multicast the stream only to designated recipients (e.g. pay-per-view TV).
Multicast and broadcast data packets are usually sent over unreliable trans-
port protocols, such as the User Data Protocol (UDP). This may cause packet
loss, i.e. the stream is received incomplete by a part of the recipients.
In [6] it is demonstrated that TA are well suited to model secure multi-
cast/broadcast communication with possible packet loss, since TA were used
to model an instance of the Efficient Multi-chained Stream Signature (EMSS)
multicast protocol family [42]. The usefulness of TA in this context is a conse-
quence of the natural way in which one-to-many (one-to-all) communications
typical of multicast (broadcast) sessions can be modelled as synchronizations
between the CA constituting a TA. In particular, a multicast composition
operator ‖J was defined, which enabled the modelling of a multicast protocol
involving one sender and n receivers as one-to-J synchronizations between the
components of a TA. Recall that such an operator cannot be defined in IOA.
As a final consideration we observe that the basic communication mecha-
nism in most CCS-like process algebras, on the other hand, is pairwise syn-
chronization (in the form of an input/output handshake) between just two
processes. This shows why in [38], where a CCS-like process algebra is used
in order to exploit a well-established analysis framework, replication of pair-
wise synchronizations is used to simulate multicast/broadcast communication.
Moreover, packet loss is modelled by considering a receiver process that non-
deterministically chooses whether to receive a packet. In the TA framework,
also packet loss can be modelled in a natural way by varying the one-to-many
type of synchronization per action.
5 Towards a TA Framework for the Analysis of Security
Properties
In [7] an insecure communication scenario for TA is defined. It can be used
to analyze security properties of cryptographic communication protocols in-
volving two roles, viz. an initiator TA TS and a responder TA TR. Rather
than a direct communication between TS and TR, all communication is as-
sumed to flow through an insecure channel TA TIC . This insecure channel
may release some messages to an intruder TA TX , which in its turn can either
listen to or modify (fake) the messages passing through this channel. When
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verifying security properties for cryptographic communication protocols, it is
indeed quite common to include an additional intruder (a` la Dolev-Yao [13])
component that is supposed to be malicious and whose aim is to subvert the
protocol’s correct behaviour. A protocol specification is consequently con-
sidered secure with respect to a security property if it satisfies this property
despite the presence of the intruder. Abstracting from the cryptographic de-
tails concerning the operations according to which messages can be encrypted,
decrypted, hashed, etc., the insecure scenario is informally described by the
TA interactions sketched in Fig. 1.
TI
TP
injecteavesdrop
assertions assertionssend/receivesend/receive ICTTS TR
TX
publicpublic
Fig. 1. An insecure communication scenario for TA.
TP denotes the TA representing the protocol specification in the absence of
the intruder. It is thus defined by hiding all public send/receive actions that
pass through the insecure channel and then enforcing max-ai synchroniza-
tion between {TS, TR, TIC}. TP is called the max-ai TA over {TS, TR, TIC}
that is obtained after hiding all public send/receive actions. TP thus appears
as a black box, possibly with some output actions (assertion) signalling the
successful reception of messages. Usually such signals are used only for verifi-
cation purposes. TI denotes the TA representing the protocol specification in
the presence of the intruder. So-called eavesdrop and inject actions serve as
the backdoor for intrusion. This is exactly what is needed to guarantee that
the intruder may communicate with TP only through the insecure channel. TI
is thus defined to be the max-ai TA over {TP , TX} that is obtained after hiding
all actions the intruder can eavesdrop from and inject back into the insecure
channel. In this way, maximal synchronization is enforced also between the
intruder and the protocol. This defines an insecure communication scenario
for TA by composing a secure communication scenario with an intruder.
In the literature, several efforts have been made to prevent the unautho-
rized information flow in multilevel computer systems [8], i.e. systems where
processes and objects are bound to a specific security level. An example from
military jargon is the fact that documents are generally hierarchized from un-
classified to top secret. The seminal idea of non interference proposed in [25]
aims at assuring that information can only flow from low levels to higher ones.
The first taxonomy of non-interference-like properties has been uniformly de-
fined and compared in [17,18,19] in the context of a CCS-like process algebra.
In particular, processes in the algebra were divided into high and low pro-
cesses, according to the level of actions that they can perform. To detect
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whether an incorrect information flow (i.e. from high to low) has occurred, a
particular non-interference-like property has been defined, the so-called Non
Deducibility on Compositions (NDC). NDC essentially says that a process is
secure with respect to wrong information flows if its low behaviour in isola-
tion appears to be the same as its low behaviour when interacting with any
high-level process. NDC can be reformulated from the world of multilevel sys-
tems to the one of network security. See [21,23], where the low-level process
becomes a specification of a cryptographic communication protocol and the
behaviour of the protocol running in isolation is compared with that of the
protocol running in parallel with any possible adversary.
As a further step, a Generalized NDC (GNDC) has been formulated in [23],
in order to encompass in a uniform way many security properties. Informally,
a specification P satisfies GNDC α(P )/ if and only if P , despite the fact that
it is running in a hostile environment, appears indistinguishable from α(P )
(with respect to a notion / of external observation). This α(P ) represents the
correct behaviour of P . By varying α(P ), several security properties can be
defined and analyzed within this generalized schema. 1 In order to embed TA
in the well-established analysis framework just described, a formulation of the
GNDC schema in terms of TA was given in [7].
Based on the GNDC schema in terms of TA, a compositional analysis
strategy for the above insecure scenario is described. This strategy can be
used to verify security properties in the communication protocol modelled by
the scenario. In fact, in [7] the GNDC schema in terms of TA, together with
the insecure communication scenario for TA, was used to show that integrity
is guaranteed in the deterministic (1,2) schema of the EMSS protocol. While
this has already been validated in [38], where a CCS-like process algebra was
used instead, this particular case study does show the effectiveness of TA
for the analysis of security properties. One may comment that [7] tests a
theoretical approach over a protocol for which the security property to be
verified is already known to be guaranteed. Nevertheless, this case study
has been investigated for testing the approach. However, the use of TA is
not limited to proving integrity, but also other safety security properties like
secrecy and entity authentication can be verified.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we presented a survey of the use of TA for the specification
and analysis of some issues from the field of security. More precisely, we have
showed how TA can adequately be used to model and verify access control
policies, multicast/broadcast communication protocols, and (cryptographic)
communication protocols. In many ways, this paper accompanies [30], where
a survey of the use of TA for CSCW was presented. An increasing number
1 Recently a slightly extended GNDC schema was defined [22], incorporating the fact that
the set of bad behaviours of P may depend on P itself and on the property under scrutiny.
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of papers bears witness to the usefulness of TA in the early design phase of
distributed and reactive systems. The examples are not limited to fields like
CSCW [5,15,14,33] and security [3,4,6,7], but extend to areas like software
engineering [16,27,28]. In fact, a spectrum from hardware components to
protocols for interacting groups of people has been modelled by TA.
The TA framework supports the design of reactive and distributed sys-
tems and protocols by making explicit the role of actions and the choice of
transitions governing the communication, coordination, cooperation, and col-
laboration. Moreover, the formal setup and the possibility of a modular design
provide analytic tools for the verification of desired properties of complex com-
puter systems. Model-checking techniques, such as those employed in [3], can
consequently be used to validate the resulting systems. A goal for the future
is to try to automate the currently manual specification and verification of
properties in the TA framework. Since TA form an extension of IOA, the IOA
Language and Toolset [24] may be of help when trying to achieve this goal.
This framework provides tool support for defining IOA as well as validating
their properties (through theorem proving, model checking, and simulation).
Another goal for the future is to extend the TA framework with time,
probability, or both. Such extensions of automata-based formalisms have been
well studied in the literature, e.g. for IOA [36,44]. In this respect, also the well-
developed theory of timed automata needs to be mentioned [1,32]. Like their
IOA counterparts, timed TA could consider the elapsing of time in the systems
they model, whereas probabilistic TA could allow a probabilistic choice of the
next state. Both have been extensively used to describe a variety of timing-
based algorithms and probabilistic cryptographic protocols, and to prove their
properties. Given these existing automata-theoretic results, the extension of
TA with time and probability is expected to be a feasible one.
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